The Exception Swallows the Rule: Market Conditions as a Factor Other Than Sex in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation by Pauley, Judith A.
Volume 86 | Issue 1 Article 11
September 1983
The Exception Swallows the Rule: Market
Conditions as a Factor Other Than Sex in Title VII
Disparate Impact Litigation
Judith A. Pauley
West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Judith A. Pauley, The Exception Swallows the Rule: Market Conditions as a Factor Other Than Sex in Title VII Disparate Impact Litigation,
86 W. Va. L. Rev. (1983).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss1/11
THE EXCEPTION SWALLOWS THE RULE: MARKET
CONDITIONS AS A "FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX"
IN TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT LITIGATION
JUDITH ANNE PAULEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1960, only a little more than twenty-three million women (thirty-eight
percent of the female population) were in the labor force. Today, there are
more than twice as many women working and the labor force participation
rate has risen to fifty-three percent.1 Along with this increase in the number
of working women have come far-reaching social changes. Structural changes
in the type of work women perform, however, is lagging behind, as are earn-
ings for women. Although women accounted for forty-three percent of all
workers in 1981, the average woman earns only fifty-nine percent of the
average man's earnings.2
There are numerous discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons for
this wage disparity. The line between the two is often a fine one. Leading the
list of reasons for the wage differential is the undervaluation of women's
work. The majority of working women continue to be concentrated in low
paying, dead-end jobs. Although much less severely than in the past, women
are socialized to work in segregated, traditionally female-held occupations. 3 A
great number of women are holding jobs in the service field in positions as
secretaries, cashiers, nurses and teachers. Correspondingly, those occupa-
tions with a high percentage of female employees tend to have low average
hourly earnings.' For example, although the textile products industry ranks
first in female employment (81.9% of employees are women), it ranks fiftieth
in average hourly earnings. The bituminous coal and lignite mining industry,
on the other hand, ranks fifty-second in percentage of women employees (only
5.1/o) but is first in average hourly earnings.'
The law of supply and demand is a theory often used to explain the rela-
tionship between earnings and occupation concentration. With the supply of
women seeking traditionally female jobs exceeding demand, employers need
* J.D. 1983, West Virginia University College of Law; Associate, King, Betts & Allen,
Charleston, W. Va.
' WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEFT OF LABOR, Report No. 673, THE
FEMALE-MALE EARNINGS GAP: A REVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS ISSUES, 1 (1982).
2 WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACTS ON WOMEN
WORKERS, 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS].
I Statistics show that women were 80% of all clerical workers in 1981 but only 6% of all craft
workers; 62/0 of all service workers but only 45% of all professional and technical workers, and
63/0 of all retail sales workers but only 28% of all nonfarm managers and administrators. Id. at 2.
' WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 1, at 2.
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not pay women wages equal to those in male-dominated fields.' Employers
are assured of finding women to work for whatever wages they care to offer.
Because men need not seek lower paying jobs, the competition for higher
paying positions increases, compounding job segregation. 7 This occupational
segregation is not likely to end with legislation to protect women so long as
social attitudes remain which limit a woman's prospects of employment.
Although it was once believed that another factor contributing to the
undervaluation of women's work was that women, on the average, were less
well-educated than men, this is no longer true. Today, the average woman
worker is as well-educated as the average male worker. In March 1981 both
had completed a median of 12.7 years of schooling.' This recent increase in
education, however, appears to be doing women little good. More education
does not necessarily mean greater earnings. Women workers with four or
more years of college education had about the same income as men who had
only one to three years of high school-$12,085 and $11,936, respectively, in
1981. When employed full-time year round, women high school graduates
(with no college) had about the same income on the average as fully employed
men who had not completed elementary school-$12,332 and $12,866, respec-
tively.' As a group, working and nonworking women need to increase their
education level, triggering a higher value assessment of their worth in the
labor market.
The discontinuous worklives of women has also been thought to con-
tribute to their low paying jobs. This factor may be changing somewhat as
young women are no longer expected to marry early and devote most of their
lives to raising a family. Many young people are postponing marriage,
families have become smaller, and many young mothers are continuing to
work. Thus, a much larger proportion of young women are gaining more
years of work experience than in the past and fewer young women are inter-
rupting their worklives.
Unionization of women's jobs would no doubt narrow the earnings gap
somewhat. Only about fifteen percent of all women workers are members of
unions, considerably less than their proportion of the labor force."0 The earn-
ings of employed women represented by labor organizations in May 1977 ex-
ceeded those of "unorganized" women in all industries and occupations by
thirty percent." Just as in the general work force, however, the usual weekly
' Bergman, Occupational Segregation: Wages and Profits When Employers Discriminate by
Race or Sex, 1 E. ECON. J. 103-10 (1975).
U.S. Dep't of Labor Bull., Working Women: A Databook (1982).
' FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 2, at 2.
9Id.
1" WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR
MOVEMENT, at 1 (1980).
11 Id.
[Vol. 86
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss1/11
MARKET CONDITIONS
earnings of organized men also exceeded those of organized women, in-
dicating unionization of women is not going to eliminate the earnings gap.
Nondiscriminatory factors contributing to the wage disparity have been
studied. When characteristics of individual workers such as age, years of
schooling and labor force experience are studied, the estimated female-male
wage gap is reduced by about seven percentage points. 2 This leaves a thirty-
four percent differential that cannot be explained by neutral factors.
The concentration of women in segregated, low paying jobs is not entire-
ly the result of a woman's socialization. "Female jobs" are often the result of
union efforts to assure that "men's jobs" are protected from competition. As
protective legislation for women and children laborers was introduced,
unions were no longer interested in protective legislation for all workers.13
These restrictions on the employment of women rendered women less
desirable as employees. At union insistence, women were limited to non-
essential jobs (which constituted "light" work) leaving the more important
jobs unrestricted and only available to men. 4 Thus, both unions and protec-
tive legislation for women, although seemingly beneficial, have contributed to
wage discrimination.
Employers are a major contributor to discriminatory employment prac-
tices, but their practices only reflect the attitudes of society at large.
American society has highly valued traits such as physical strength and ag-
gression, traits that also just happen to be more common to the male gender.
These societal attitudes are transferred through employers to wage deter-
mination scales to value the worth of an employer's positions. Women's work
becomes undervalued because, although many of their jobs require high skill
(such as nursing and teaching), they do not involve highly valued traits such
as aggression and physical strength.
Conscious segregation may be an employer's practice as well as
discriminatorily weighted wage determination scales. Although no longer
permitted to indicate sexual preference in job advertising, employers tend to
hire women for traditionally female positions. This same tendency works to a
man's detriment should he seek employment in a female-dominated occupa-
tion.
The effect of all the aforementioned factors is that most men and women
participate in separate labor markets. As has been demonstrated, these
separate labor markets differ widely in wages paid. The wage differential
" Mellow, Employer Size, Unionism, and Wages in RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS (JAI
Press, forthcoming).
11 For a discussion of the role of unions in protective legislation, see B. BABCOCK, A. FREED-
MAN, E.H. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 247-82 (1975).
" See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
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between women and men is then perpetuated by the continuing use of these
discriminatory wage determinations found in the marketplace. Employers
use these market determinations of women's work to value their own com-
pany's jobs. For example, should a hospital administrator be faced with the
task of establishing a salary for nurse's aides, he or she is likely to turn to
valuations made by similar employers in the community or state. This seem-
ingly "neutral" wage setting practice, when applied against a background of
overtly discriminatory wage rates, perpetuates the wage differentials be-
tween women and men.
Should the employer need to determine the wage for a woman's position
that is unique, he or she can no longer refer to the community determination.
Instead, they may use their own subjective criteria to rate the value of that
woman's job. The employer's assessment is colored by the value traditionally
given female traits by society as well as by his or her personal beliefs. This
discriminatory internal labor market will become a part of the already
discriminatory external labor market when the employer reports its wage
rates to various surveys.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that reliance on these cur-
rently discriminatory market conditions in establishing employee salaries
should not be a defense to a change of bias in a facially neutral wage setting
system. Women in segregated jobs have been bringing suit under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 alleging that wage setting criteria may be
facially neutral, but have an adverse impact on women as a group. Courts are
being faced with the question of whether the employer may meet such
charges with the defense that the labor market has permitted such a pay for-
mulation. Employers deem market conditions to be a "factor other than sex""1
isolating them from liability in wage discrimination suits. Considering the
purpose of Title VII, along with the legislative history of this and other
remedial legislation, courts should reject market conditions as a defense.
It is not the purpose of this paper to address in detail the comparable
worth debate. Because consideration of comparable worth is a necessary
prerequisite to the author's thesis, however, some discussion is required. Ad-
ditionally, the establishment of a prima facie case alleging wage setting
criteria to have an adverse impact on women differs under the facts of each
case. Although addressed to a limited extent, the focus remains on the
employer's defense to such a suit.
II. EQUAL PAY ACT
In the Equal Pay Act of 1963,7 Congress attempted to narrow the wage
's 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (1976).
17 Id. § 206(d).
[Vol. 86
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol86/iss1/11
MARKET CONDITIONS
differential between women and men by requiring equal pay for equal work.
In order for a woman to be entitled to equal pay, however, she had to prove
her job required equal skill, effort, and responsibility as that of a man's, as
well as performing the job under similar working conditions.'8 The statute
was intended to "eliminate sex as a basis for wage differentials between
employees performing equal work on jobs within the establishment .... 11
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,"o inter-
preted the remedial purposes of the Act.
The Act was intended as a broad charter of women's rights in the economic
field. It sought to overcome the age-old belief in women's inferiority and to
eliminate the depressing effects on living standards of reduced wages for
female workers and the economic and social consequences which flow from it."
The economic and social consequences of disparate wages were con-
sidered to be both innately unfair and economically inefficient. In the
"Declaration of Purpose" of the Equal Pay Act, Congress specified:
The purpose of the Act as set out in the statute is:
Sec. 2. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce of wage dif-
ferentials based on sex-
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees necessary for their
health and efficiency;
(2) prevents the maximum utilization of the available labor resources;
(3) tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening, affecting, and obstructing
commerce;
(4) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5) constitutes an unfair method of competition.
(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through exer-
cise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States
and with foreign nations, to correct the conditions above referred to in such in-
dustries.'
Congress had a large goal in mind for such narrow legislation.
Three specific exceptions and one broad general exception to equal pay
for equal work were prescribed in the Act. It was the intent of Congress that
any wage differential resulting from a seniority system, merit system, or a
system which measures earnings of quantity or quality of production was to
,8 Id. § 206(d)(1).
29 C.F.R. § 800.114 (1967).
421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
", 421 F.2d at 265.
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963).
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be exempted from the operation of the Act.' As Congress believed it impossi-
ble to list all possible exceptions, they also included the general exemption of
a "factor other than sex". 4 If the pay differential could be explained on the
basis of a factor other than sex, a valid defense to a charge of unequal pay for
equal work was established.
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff car-
ries the initial burden of proof to show that the employer pays workers of
one sex more than workers of the opposite sex for equal work. 5 The
employee must be prepared to demonstrate that her job is equal to that of a
man's in skill, effort, and responsibility, and is performed under similar work-
ing conditions. The burden then shifts to the employer to show that the dif-
ferential is justified under one of the Act's four exceptions. In its case-in-chief
the employer carries the burden of proof as the Act's exceptions are con-
sidered to be affirmative defenses.'
A. Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Than Sex" Under the Equal
Pay Act
As under Title VII, employers in Equal Pay Act suits have claimed
market conditions to be a "factor other than sex." The case of Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan" is most well-known for this defense. Corning Glass Works
paid its night inspectors, who were all male, significantly higher wages than
its day inspectors, who were all female and performed the same tasks. This
pay differential was a result of the company's past discriminatory practices.
In 1930, when Corning originally instituted a night shift, the state laws in
Pennsylvania and New York prohibited women from working at night. Thus,
only males could be hired as night inspectors. To encourage men to transfer
from day shift jobs to night, substantially higher wages were offered for
night work, even though the work was the same. Although the state laws
prohibiting women from working at night were repealed earlier, Corning fail-
ed to open the night shift to women until 1966. The Equal Pay Act required
such a move two years earlier, in 1964. In 1969 a new collective bargaining
agreement attempted to bring the company in compliance with the Equal Pay
Act. Although the agreement equalized the wages for all inspectors (day and
night), the plan provided an exception. A "red circle" base rate was provided
for all night inspectors hired prior to the date of the labor agreement in 1969.
This "red circle" rate served to perpetuate the wage differential between
women and men.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1(i)(iii) (1976).
24 Id. § 206(d)(1)(iv).
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
Id. at 196.
" 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
[Vol. 86
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Corning defended the charge by arguing that the higher base wage was
merely intended to serve as added compensation for night work. Thus, Corn-
ing asserted that the differential was based on a "factor other than sex".
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, found this explanation unaccep-
table as other night work at Corning did not receive higher compensation.
The Court found that higher wages were paid to night inspectors because of
the need to compensate men for performing what were regarded as demean-
ing tasks. The Court held:
The differential arose simply because men would not work at the low rates
paid women inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning could
pay women less than men for the same work. That the company took advan-
tage of such a situation may be understandable as a matter of economics, but
its differential nevertheless became illegal once Congress enacted into law the
principle of equal pay for equal work.'
Clearly, the Supreme Court has rejected market conditions as a "factor other
than sex" when equal work is involved.
Under the Equal Pay Act, other courts have refused to recognize market
conditions as a "factor other than sex". In Hodgson v. Brookhaven General
Hospital,' the employer claimed that the wage differential between nurses
aides (primarily women) and orderlies (primarily men) was necessary as its
hospital could not recruit orderlies unless they paid them more than nurses
aides. The Fifth Circuit held that the greater bargaining power enjoyed by
employers with respect to women was not the kind of factor Congress had in
mind."
A wage differential between a male note teller and female note tellers
was the subject of a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor in Brennan v.
Victoria Bank & Trust Co.31 The bank claimed that the wage differential was
due to college and work experience as well as market conditions (what salary
will the best applicant accept). The Secretary of Labor argued that the
market force theory is not a valid consideration under the Equal Pay Act.
The court agreed that women's willingness to work for less than men is not a
valid consideration under the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act32 and does not justify salary discrimination based on sex. 3
In Marshall v. Georgia Southwestern College,34 the Board of Regents con-
ceded that the salaries for new teachers were determined by supply and de-
l Id- at 205.
436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
LId. at 726.
s' 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974).
32 The Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
493 F.2d at 899.
489 F. Supp. 1322 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
1983]
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mand. Women professors were paid less as they were willing to work for less.
The Board of Regents argued that they were not responsible for the realities
of the open market and that it was a "factor other than sex". The court held
otherwise. The majority reasoned the market force theory was not the kind
of factor included within the catch-all exception, especially when it appeared
that females have been willing to accept lower salaries than males.35
Courts considering Equal Pay Act claims are continuing to reject the
market theory as a "factor other than sex". As recently as last year, the
District Court of Texas did so in Schulte v. Wilson Industries, Inc."0 Courts
also refuse as defenses job differences that do not reflect a difference in
economic value to a company, 7 and claims that women are more costly to
employ than men.' Wage-setting attributable to sexual stereotyping has
been rejected as a defense, 9 as have job classification systems designed to
keep women in a subordinate role. 0
B. Limiting Nature of the Equal Pay Act
Although market conditions have been rejected as a defense in Equal Pay
Act claims, the narrow scope of the Equal Pay Act must be kept in mind.
Only suits alleging equal work will be addressed by the courts. The Equal
Pay Act does not address the problem of job segregation, and therefore does
not provide a remedy for those women who are trapped in low paying, large-
ly sex-segregated jobs. Wage differentials between workers doing dissimilar
work cannot be compared under the Act.41 In suits brought under the Act,
consideration ends should dissimilar work be found between the men and
women. Because of the limiting nature of the Act, courts are not able to ad-
dress the reality of job segregation which leaves the Equal Pay Act pro-
viding a limited remedy applicable only to blatant discrimination.
III. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on the other hand, has the poten-
tial to have a far greater impact on wage discrimination. It was broadly
drafted with the objective of eradicating employment discrimination in all its
Id. at 1330.
s, 547 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970); but cf.
Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (difference
in profitability as between men's and women's departments is an allowable defense).
Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Hodgson v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 317 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
445 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1971) (employer arbitrarily accorded greater weight to physical effort).
O Brennan v. Prince William Hosp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974).
41 "[llt is clear that Congress did not intend to apply the equal pay standards to jobs sub-
stantially differing in their terms and conditions." 29 C.F.R. § 800.120 (1980).
[Vol. 86
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forms. The Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,2 observed that,
[I]n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to
prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment
opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, and ordained that its policy of outlawing such discrimination
should have the highest priority. . ..
The Act thus proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. 4 Because of this broad
objective, Title VII should not be limited to sex-based wage discrimination
claims that would be actionable under the Equal Pay Act. However, this is
exactly what a number of courts in the past had done. This limitation serious-
ly jeopardized the congressional intent that employment discrimination be
eliminated. In 1972, in considering amendments to Title VII, Congress en-
dorsed a broad interpretation of Title VII, indicating that discrimination had
proven to be more pervasive, subtle and complex than had been anticipated
in 1964." The courts' justification for limiting Title VII to claims of equal
work was the Bennett Amendment,4" an addition to Title VII.
A. Bennett Amendment
In an attempt to harmonize the Equal Pay Act with Title VII, Senator
Bennett proposed an amendment to Title VII. The text of the Bennett
Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if
such differentiation is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act].
Conflict soon arose over the meaning of the word "authorized" in the Amend-
ment. On one side was the theory that only the four exceptions in the Equal
Pay Act were incorporated into Title VII.4 1 On the other side, it was argued
that all of the Equal Pay Act was incorporated, including the equal work re-
quirement.48
The hotly contested issue was decided with the Supreme Court's inter-
424 U.S. 747 (1976).
4 Id. at 763.
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
'5 Both the House and Senate Committee Reports Section-by-Section analysis of the Com-
mittee bills to amend Title VII cite the complex and subtle nature of discrimination. 118 CONG.
REC. S3462 (daily ed. March 6, 1972); 118 CONG. REC. H1962 (daily ed. March 8, 1972).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
See, e.g., IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980).
's See, e.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980).
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pretation of the Bennett Amendment's effect in County of Washington v.
Gunther." Female prison guards brought suit under Title VII alleging they
were paid unequal wages for work substantially equal to that performed by
male guards, and in the alternative, that part of the pay differential was at-
tributable to intentional sex discrimination. The district court dismissed
respondents' charges after applying Equal Pay Act standards.10 The court
found that male guards supervised more prisoners and that female guards
devoted much of their time to less valuable clerical duties. The majority
therefore held that the respondents' jobs were not substantially equal to
those of the male guards, and as such were not entitled to equal pay. The
district court also dismissed respondents' claim of intentional sex discrimina-
tion holding that a sex-based wage discrimination claim cannot be brought
under Title VII unless it would satisfy the equal work standard of the Equal
Pay Act.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court as to the jobs of female
guards not being substantially equal to that of male guards, but reversed the
lower court on the issue of equal work being a prerequisite to suit under
Title VII.5 ' The question was then certified to the United States Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court undertook a review of the Bennett Amendment and
its legislative history. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that
the word "authorize" in the Bennett Amendment referred only to the second
part of the Equal Pay Act (in which the equal work requirement was not a
part).2 This meant that only the four employer defenses contained in the
Equal Pay Act were to be included under Title VII. The majority held that a
Title VII claim is not barred merely because claimants do not perform equal
work to that of an employee of the opposite sex."3 This holding was found to
be consistent with the brief legislative history of the Bennett Amendment
and the goals of Title VII.5 4
In considering Gunther, it is as important to recognize what the Court
did not decide as it is to understand the majority's holding. Although holding
that a suit need not allege equal work to be actionable under Title VII, no
guidelines were provided for the theory and scope of such a cause of action.
The elements necessary to make out a prima facie case of sex-based wage
discrimination were left undecided.5 The dissent characterized the majority's
452 U.S. 161 (1981).
5 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehg denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1980).
5' Id.
452 U.S. at 171.
Id at 181.
Id. at 171-80.
Id at 166, n.8.
[Vol. 86
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decision as akin to a "restricted railroad ticket, 'good for this day and train
only'.""6 Advocates of comparable worth claims were left with as little
guidance after Gunther as they were before.
Additionally, because the respondents in Gunther alleged intentional
discrimination on the part of their employer, and the Court was content to
limit its holding to that question of intent, it is not known if a prima facie
case under Title VII must demonstrate a discriminatory intent. If so, covert
discriminatory acts would be difficult to prove. Employers relying on market
conditions to establish wages then have a ticket to continue discriminatory
practices.
B. Comparable Worth Theory
Although left undecided by the Supreme Court in Gunther, the issue of
comparable worth is extremely important as it relates to Title VII protec-
tion. 7 Due to job segregation, where women and men do not perform the
same work, employers are able to realize the benefits of discrimination
without instituting an obviously unlawful wage structure or violating the
Equal Pay Act. Specifically, employers are permitted to pay unequal wages
for what is, in many cases, comparable work.
Title VII's scope should be enlarged to allow the majority of women
employed in segregated jobs to attack wage discrimination. This is not a
possibility unless courts begin to consider comparable work in the establish-
ment of a prima facie case under Title VII. Courts should be mindful that, by
not considering the realities of job segregation, they may very well be pro-
viding women with less of a remedy under Title VII than is available to
blacks or other protected classes.' The courts' concern for avoiding a new
and complex type of Title VII suits should not stand in the way of a working
woman's right to comparable pay.
C. Wage Discrimination Claims Under Title VII
Two types of claims alleging wage discrimination may be brought under
Title VII. The first is a disparate treatment case where an individual woman
or class of women seek equal treatment with that of men as regards wages.
An Equal Pay Act analysis is applied to these cases since they involve equal
Id. at 183 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 397 (1979); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimina-
tion & the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 231 (1980).
IUE, 631 F.2d at 1100. It might be argued that providing women with less of a remedy
under Title VII than other protected classes was the purpose of the Bennett Amendment. How-
ever, it would seem both unreasonable and unfair to require a clearer congressional intent of equal
opportunity for women than is required for other Title VII protected classes.
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work. The plaintiff must ultimately prove intentional discrimination on the
part of her employer.
A disparate treatment claim is not a likely possibility for the majority of
women who suffer from covert discrimination due to job segregation and the
employer's use of market conditions to establish wages. Only if the definition
of "intent" were given a more expansive construction could a disparate treat-
ment case become a possibility for these women. The definition of "intent"
would need to include those acts that are prompted by subconscious beliefs
regarding the value of women's work. Otherwise, the proper avenue would
be a disparate impact case. In such a suit, a class of women seek equal oppor-
tunity between men and women in employment. No showing of intentional
discrimination is necessary for women to challenge the use of the market to
determine their wages. 9
Title VII can be the proper avenue for a disparate impact suit, as was ar-
ticulated by Chief Justice Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.60 In speaking
of the objective of Congress in enacting Title VII, he wrote:
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and move barriers
that have, operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of... employees
over other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment prac-
tices. 1
Nothing in the Gunther opinion indicates that this analysis is not applicable
to claims of discrimination in wage rates.
D. Title VII Disparate Impact Claims
There are two basic types of disparate impact cases claiming wage
discrimination. The "pure" form of disparate impact is where women bring
suit not challenging the wage itself, but challenging the criteria which deter-
mine the wage. These criteria depend on characteristics peculiar to a par-
ticular group of employees. An example of such a suit is found in Kouba v.
Allstate Ins. Co."2 In this case, the plaintiff alleged the company's method of
establishing the "monthly minimum" for new sales agents/trainees
discriminated against women. The "monthly minimum" represented the ac-
tual salary paid to all new sales agents during the first three months of their
employment by Allstate while they were trained for their new positions. This
"monthly minimum" was to be set commensurate with the individual's abili-
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
o Id. at 424.
I1 1d. at 430 (emphasis added).
62 523 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 33,123 (9th Cir. 1982).
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ty, experience, education and current salary situation. "Current salary situa-
tion" meant the salary the applicant received in the employment immediately
preceding hire by Allstate. Although facially neutral, the plaintiff claimed the
result of the system was to pay women less than men. She presented
statistical evidence to show that the differences between male agents' mean
(average) and female agents was about seven standard deviations. 3 Use of an
individual's prior salary perpetuated the use of poor wages traditionally
given to women. The district court accepted plaintiff's statistical evidence as
proof of a prima facie case."4
In the second type of disparate impact case the plaintiff alleges bias in a
facially neutral wage evaluation system due to job segregation. Here the
wage is directly challenged. The bias creating the depressed wage may be a
result of internal establishment prejudice, external establishment prejudice,
or a combination of both. With internal establishment bias the employer fixes
wages by observing a job and ranking it in relation to other jobs." The prob-
lem with this practice is that the employer may allow biased personal
preference, about current employees and the job itself, to weigh the deter-
mination."8 In particular, the employer may give more value (and thus higher
rates) to male traits and skills. This ranking method is often employed where
jobs are unique, thereby preventing the use of previously established wages
in the market. Such was the case in Heagney v. University of Washington7
where the plaintiff was employed in the nuclear physics lab (NPL) to design
and fabricate targets used in nuclear physics experiments. Her salary was
established by a supervisory committee of the NPL because her job was one
with unique requirements. The plaintiff in Heagney, like the plaintiff in
Kouba, used statistics to prove that as a group, women exempt employees at
the University received disproportionately lower salaries than men.
However, because the gravamen of the plaintiff's case was that the lack of
well-defined employment criteria allowed a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion to exist, the court concluded that a disparate treatment case was the
proper avenue for her claim rather than a disparate impact case." This
holding is questionable since the plaintiff was not alleging intentional
discrimination on the part of the University. It must be recognized that bias
regarding the value of women's work is often not intentionally interjected by
the employer. It is interposed as a result of conditioning and societal at-
titudes, something the courts surely should not expect a plaintiff to prove.
' Deviations become significant when greater than two or three standard deviations.
Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
" 523 F. Supp. at 159.
0 R. SIBSON, COMPENSATION: A COMPLETE REVISION OF "WAGES AND SALARIES" 38-39 (1974).,
" Id
17 642 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1981).
1 Id at 1163.
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Bias in a facially neutral wage evaluation system may also be the result
of external establishment bias. This occurs when an employer uses the supply
and demand of the market or community wage rates to dictate the worth of
jobs within the establishment. Given statistics showing the concentration of
women within a few occupations and the overall undervaluation of women's
work," the result of using market conditions to establish wages will be
perpetuation of wage discrimination.0 It is in these types of cases that the
employer most often relies on the market conditions to be a "factor other
than sex," insulating him from liability.
In 1977 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had the occasion to decide
this type of disparate impact suit. In Christensen v. State of Iowa,71 female
clerical workers at the University of Northern Iowa (UNI) brought suit alleg-
ing wage discrimination toward women was present at UNI. Prior to 1974,
the University determined the wage scales for nonprofessional jobs by
reference to wages paid for similar work in the local labor market. Although
all jobs at UNI were open to persons of both sexes, the nonprofessional jobs
tended to be segregated by sex. 2 The labor market in the surrounding com-
munity was similarly segregated. As a result, UNI's pay system perpetuated
the traditional disparity between the wages paid to women and those paid to
men. Although the University initially used an objective method to deter-
mine the worth of nonprofessional jobs,73 wages were actually determined
when the point worth of a job was compared to similar jobs in the market.
Because the local job market paid higher wages for physical plant jobs than
the beginning pay under the employer's system, UNI modified the system to
give advanced pay for many of the physical plant workers but not clerical
employees. Although the plaintiffs were able to establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact, the court found for the University as UNI permitted
women to work in physical plant jobs as well as men.74
Regardless of the type of disparate impact case alleging wage discrimina-
tion brought under Title VII, the establishment of a prima facie case remains
basically the same. A plaintiff bringing a disparate impact claim must
establish that (1) she or he is a member of a protected class; (2) a given
employment practice "operates to disqualify [member of plaintiff's] class at a
" See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
70 R. SIMsON. supra note 65, at 44.
7' 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis.
1982).
r All the employees in UNI's clerical department were women and the great majority of the
employees in its physical plant were men.
"' UNI used the Hayes System under which compensation was to be based on an objective
evaluation of each job's relative worth to the employer regardless of the market price.
"' 563 F.2d at 357.
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substantially higher rate" than other employees; and (3) plaintiff was denied
an employment opportunity due to this practice. 5 The claim is not premised
on the discriminatory application of an employment practice, but on the fact
that the practice itself, neutral on its face and impartially applied, has
adverse consequences for members of a particular group."'
Evidence that an employer's wage-setting system has had an adverse im-
pact on women employees can be developed and presented through statistics."
One commentator has suggested that a simple showing of sex-segregated
jobs in the workplace will establish a prima facie case of disparate impact."s
However, it is more likely that a court will require an additional showing of
disparate compensation between traditionally "women's" and "men's" jobs.
Multiple regression analysis, a statistical device for making precise and quan-
titative estimates of the effects of different factors on some variable of in-
terest, can be used to identify disparities in compensation that cannot be ac-
counted for by differences in the training, effort or responsibility required by
the jobs themselves.7 9 This statistical proof, based on an adequate sample and
showing a substantial adverse impact, provides the nexus to raise an in-
ference of discrimination.0
After establishing a prima facie case the plaintiff may also wish to pre-
sent evidence of less discriminatory alternatives. Use of a comparable worth
value or more objective standards in determining employee wages could
replace the employer's reliance on community wage rates and subjective
criteria. One alternative method of determining wages, which has been noted
for its objectivity, is the Hayes system," used by the University of Northern
Iowa (UNI) in Christensen. This pay scheme contemplates compensation be-
ing based on an objective evaluation of each job's relative worth to the
employer regardless of the community wage rate or supply and demand.
With UNI, the Hayes system evaluated all jobs in terms of thirty-eight fac-
tors and assigned points for each factor. Jobs with similar points were placed
in the same labor grade, regardless of the actual content of the job. Use by
employers of this scheme should theoretically eliminate the undervaluation
of "women's" work.
7 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
7 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
Use of statistics in the establishment of a prima facie case is discussed more fully in Note,
Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebut-
tal 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975).
" Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 397, 459 (1979).
" For a thorough discussion of the use of multiple regression analysis in wage discrimination
suits, see D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PRoOF (1983); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceed-
ings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980).
See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
81 See Christensen, 563 F.2d at 354.
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The burden then shifts to the employer to defend his employment prac-
tices. The focus of this paper is limited to the employer's defense that the
wage differentials between women and men are based on a "factor other than
sex." Specifically, the question is whether the employer's use of market con-
ditions to determine in-house wages constitutes a "factor other than sex."
Because all of the defenses under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) are considered to be affir-
mative defenses, 2 the employer carries the burden of proof.
E. The Employer's Defense
The employer can argue that his company's wages actually are determin-
ed by the "free" market on the basis of the neutral forces of the supply of
qualified workers and the demand for their skills. Another defensive ra-
tionale is that employee wages are determined by the community wage rate.
The arguments are closely linked.
The problems with these arguments are many. First, according to
Department of Labor guidelines, the requirements for a "factor other than
sex" are not met unless "the factor of sex provides no part of the basis for
the wage differential."" As shall be explained, use of market conditions to
determine wages most definitely encompasses the sex of the employee as a
factor in setting wages.
The employer's argument that women's wages are determined by the
theory of supply and demand lacks understanding of the assumptions present
in that theory. Some of the premises of the supply and demand theory are
that workers have full knowledge of the market and that the worker makes
his or her own decisions as to wages and jobs performed.84 The theory also
assumes that employers act individually and not in concert when par-
ticipating in the labor market."
In reality, the individual woman is not in an equal position to bargain due
to ignorance about wage rates and the undervaluation of women's work, the
latter resulting from the concerted, though at times unintentional, actions of
employers and unions. In essence, too many false assumptions are required
for the theory to work. Use of the supply and demand theory places blame on
the individual woman worker who bargained poorly and found herself under-
paid. It should also be noted that some employers cannot rely on the supply
and demand theory to explain the undervaluation of "women's" jobs. In cer-
tain professions, such as nursing, although the market demand is high and
the supply low, wages remain depressed.
Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196.
29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1980).
" F. MARSHALL, A. KING & V. BRIGGS, JR., LABOR ECONOMICS 177 (1980).
1 Id at 178.
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The method of setting wages by community standards is more involved
than an employer would have the courts believe. There are two different oc-
casions for bias to enter this facially neutral practice. In preparation for com-
parison with the community market an employer ranks positions according to
their functional worth.86 It is at this stage that an employer can interject his
own bias regarding the worth of "women's" work. These ranked jobs are then
compared to similar jobs in similar industries within the community. 7 This
comparable, external market is significant as a mirror of discriminatory wage
practices which are simply perpetuated when an employer makes use of
them.
Empirical evidence suggests the existence of sex-based wage discrimina-
tion in the marketplace.88 Additionally, the supply and demand theory em-
bodies too many false assumptions to be applied to the realities of women in
the work force." Despite these facts employers continue to rely on market
conditions as a "factor other than sex" and more often than not the defense is
accepted by the courts.
F. Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Than Sex" in Title VII Disparate
Impact Cases
Several courts have accepted market conditions as a "factor other than
sex" when raised by the employer in a Title VII disparate impact claim. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to do so in Christensen v. State
of Iowa." In response to the plaintiff's allegation of sexually discriminatory
wages,9' the Board of Regents defended on the basis that the market rate
justified their paying physical plant employees more than clerical workers.2
When the plaintiffs attempted to explain to the court that use of the market
rate served only to perpetuate wage discrimination, the court responded:
We find nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting that Congress
intended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand or other economic prin-
ciples that determine wage rates for various kinds of work. We do not inter-
pret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage
rates for genuinely different work classifications.9 3
m N. CHAMBERLAIN & D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECTOR 296 (1971).
7Id.
See Committee on Occupational Classification and Analysis, Assembly of Behavioral and
Social Sciences, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, WOMEN, WORK. AND
WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE, 42, 44-68 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann, eds. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as WOMEN. WORK & WAGES].
8' N. Chamberlain, supra note 86, at 371.
563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
9' See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
563 F.2d at 355.
Id. at 356.
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Because the court did not want to entertain a theory of comparable worth,
the challenged wage setting practices were permitted to stand.
In Lemons v. City of Denver,94 city nurses claimed that despite a pay
parity with nurses in the community, they were undercompensated in viola-
tion of Title VII. Plaintiffs argued that nurses have historically been under-
paid because the occupation is predominantly a female one. Plaintiffs asked
the court to compare their worth to that of city employees in nonnursing
positions. The plaintiffs alleged that comparison of their jobs with other nurs-
ing jobs in the community in order to establish wages perpetuated the
historical undervaluation of their work. Although the court recognized that
"[t]he relationship of pay for nurses to pay for other positions is obviously a
product of past attitudes, practices, and perhaps of supply and demand," 5 it
declined to accept plaintiffs' comparable worth argument. The reasoning of
the court was that "this would be a whole new world for the court," and lack-
ing clear congressional directive, the courts "cannot venture into it."9 Once
again, lack of equal work stood in the way of fulfillment of Title VII's purpose
of eradicating employment discrimination in all its forms.
Market conditions have continued to be accepted as a "factor other than
sex" by courts as recently as 1982. In Briggs v. City of Madison,' public
health nurses (primarily women) brought suit claiming that although they
performed work equal to or greater than public health sanitarians (all men),
the nurses were paid less. The City argued that due to market conditions,
public health sanitarian positions required higher pay as they were difficult
to recruit and maintain. Although use of market conditions perpetuated the
biases and prejudices regarding "women's" work, the court held:
Under Title VII, an employer's liability extends only to its own acts of
discrimination. Nothing in the Act indicates that the employer's liability ex-
tends to conditions of the marketplace which it did not create. Nothing in-
dicates that it is improper for an employer to pay the wage rates necessary to
compete in the marketplace for qualified job applicants. That there may be an
abundance of applicants qualified for some jobs and a dearth of skilled ap-
plicants for other jobs is not a condition for which a particular employer bears
responsibility.98
Proponents of discarding market conditions as a defense to wage dif-
ferentials were encouraged by the federal district court's opinion in Kouba v.
Allstate Ins. Co. 9 In that case, the plaintiff challenged Allstate's use of an
, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
95 Id. at 228.
Id. at 229.
536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
9' Id. at 447.
523 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 33,123 (9th Cir. 1982).
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employee's prior salary with the preceding employer to establish a new
salary at Allstate." The defendant claimed use of prior salary was a "factor
other than sex." Because the plaintiff was performing work equal to those of
male sales agents, both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act applied to her
charge. The court interpreted the employer defenses under the two statutes
to be the same, even though plaintiff's suit was one of disparate impact
rather than disparate treatment.
In addressing the use of prior salaries as a "factor other than sex" and
whether this perpetuated past discriminatory practices, the lower court held:
[Ain employer may not set a salary schedule which differentiates between its
male and female employees doing the exact same job, based upon the im-
mediate past salaries paid to the men and women, unless it can demonstrate
that it has assessed the previous salaries and determined that they
themselves were set on "other factors other than sex." In the absence of the
proffering of such evidence, as a matter of law because of the "endemic prob-
lem" of sex discrimination, the practice does not equate with "any other factor
other than sex" and thus is not an affirmative defense sufficient to defeat
plaintiff's demonstration .... "I
Unfortunately, this powerful language and interpretation was reversed
on appeal. 2 In interpreting the meaning of a "factor other than sex" the
court of appeals rejected the district court's holding that "the employer must
demonstrate that it made a reasonable attempt to satisfy itself that the fac-
tor causing the wage differential was not the product of sex discrimination."
10 3
Instead, the court of appeals required that the employer have an acceptable
business reason for using a factor which causes a wage differential. 4 The
court, citing Corning Glass,"0 ' made note that not every reason making
economic sense would be acceptable. However, the court declined to compile
a list of unacceptable factors. It did state that in an attempt to avoid pretex-
tual business objectives the employer must use the factor reasonably in light
of its stated purpose as well as its other practices.'0
Despite the reversal of the lower court's reasoning, Kouba has narrowed
somewhat the employer's reliance on market conditions as a "factor other
than sex." In its opinion the court made it clear that the employer bears the
burden of showing the wage differential results from a "factor other than
sex."107 This means that the employer must prove and not merely articulate
10 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
101 523 F. Supp. at 162 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
112 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 33,123 (9th Cir. 1982).
103 523 F. Supp. at 162.
o2 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (OCH) 33,123, at 27,454.
I d. at 27,456 n.6.
"' 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 33,123, at 27,454.
o7 Id. at 27,453.
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an acceptable reason for using a factor which causes a wage differential.
Thus, the court came very close to requiring a business necessity for the use
of factors causing wage differentials.
Given the requirements established by the majority in Kouba, which
relied upon Corning Glass,"' cases such as Christensen and Lemon might be
decided differently today. Situations similar to that of Corning Glass where
the employer paid female inspectors less than male inspectors because the
market allowed the differential, should be struck down. Thus, in Christensen,
the fact that UNI could pay clerical workers less than physical plant workers
might not stand as an acceptable business reason. Likewise, the employer in
Lemon might not have been permitted to perpetuate the low community
wage for nurses. However, as in Briggs, should a court be convinced difficult
recruiting necessitates an inflated wage for certain predominantly male posi-
tions, the Kouba analysis may make no difference. The importance of Kouba
is that requirements for a "factor other than sex" defense have been
established, clearing the way for subsequent courts to take further steps to
eliminate the perpetuation of discriminatory wage differentials.
Given that both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act serve the same fun-
damental purpose against discrimination based on sex,"9 it is difficult to ap-
preciate the different analyses given the defense of market conditions when
presented under the two Acts. Cases brought under the Equal Pay Act and
met with the market conditions defense prevail as the market force theory is
not considered to be a "factor other than sex."' On the other hand, Title VII
claims met with the same defense fall as "[n]othing in the Act indicates that
the employer's liability extends to conditions of the marketplace which it did
not create." ' Due to the fact that Title VII is a broader statute than the
Equal Pay Act, the reverse should be true.
If the difference in analyses is due to the Court's reluctance to accept
comparable work instead of equal work, it should be remembered that both
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were directed to the discriminatory conse-
quences of an employer's practices. Whether the claim brought is one of
disparate treatment under the Equal Pay Act, or disparate impact brought
under Title VII, the effect is the same. As Justice Stevens pointed out in
Washington v. Davis,"2 an equal protection case, "[t]he line between
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and
perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might
lO Id. at 27,456 n.6.
10 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 260 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
110 See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hodgson v. Brookhaven
Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970).
' 536 F. Supp. at 447.
1 426 U.S. 229 (1975).
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assume." ' Similarly, the line between blatant sex discrimination and less
detectable discriminatory employment practices is not so bright. It is the
overall effect that should be conclusive as Congress directed the thrust of Ti-
tle VII to the "consequences of employment practices...."114
Strength may be added to this argument by the Supreme Court's opinion
in Gunther. The Court's view that the Bennett Amendment incorporates the
Equal Pay Act defenses into Title VII envisioned a consistent interpretation
by courts and administrative agencies of the first three defenses." ' Other-
wise, inconsistent bodies of case law might arise concerning two sets of near-
ly identical language. "6 This same danger is present when courts are permit-
ted to differ in their analyses of market conditions as a "factor other than
sex," the fourth defense. The defense is identical whether presented in an
Equal Pay Act case or a Title VII disparate impact case.
G. Ojections to Rejecting Market Conditions as a "Factor Other Than Sex"
More than the fear of the unknown regarding comparable worth may be
limiting the courts in Title VII disparate impact cases. American business in-
terests are sure to point out the economic and institutional consequences of
striking down market conditions as a "factor other than sex." Some of the ob-
jections already voiced include a prediction of rippling pay inflation." 7 This
would result, it is argued, if an employer is required to raise his wages to a
comparable worth standard. In order to keep their employees content, other
nearby employers would also have to raise wages. Additionally, unions would
be pressured by their members for a corresponding increase. Another objec-
tion is that employers would experience a severe monetary burden if re-
quired to set wages in disregard of the market." 8
Other institutional consequences arising from the rejection of market
conditions as an employer defense have been predicted. These include an in-
surmountable burden of proof being placed on employers, "9 and innocent
employers being required to pay for a situation they did not create.12 It has
also been argued that the judiciary hasn't the authority to interfere with the
laws of supply and demand.12" ' Perhaps the strongest objection is that the
2 Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring).
' Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
I5 452 U.S. at 170.
"1 Id.
'"See Equality of Opportunity: The Emerging Challenge in Employment, Conf. Bd. of Can.
(No. 4 1978).
"' See generally Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable
Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 233 (1980).
"9 Id. at 280.
2 Briggs, 536 F. Supp. at 447.
'2' Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 118, at 292.
1983]
21
Pauley: The Exception Swallows the Rule: Market Conditions as a Factor Ot
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
cases proposing comparable worth combined with a market-conditions
defense involve theories too complex for the courts.122
Objections relating to the cost of remedying sex-based wage discrimina-
tion are often misplaced. Title VII's primary objective is the achievement of
equitable, not economically efficient, employment practices. In enacting Title
VII, Congress in no way authorized the courts to balance the cost of
eliminating wage discrimination against its benefits. Nothing in the
legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress placed a price tag on
the cost of correcting discrimination in employment. Arguments relating to
costs should have been made prior to the enactment of Title VII, not after.
Even if Title VII was concerned with economic efficiency, it embodies an
assumption that inequitable employment practices impair the operation of
the labor market, in that such practices are ultimately inefficient." A market
concerned with traits unrelated to job capacity (such as sex) is not perform-
ing at its fullest capacity.
No insurmountable burden of proof is being placed on employers using
market conditions as a defense to a disparate impact claim. As was explained
in Kouba, employers need only prove an acceptable business reason for using
a factor which causes a wage differential.'24 It might be that the need to
recruit, as in Briggs, would provide an acceptable business reason. This hard-
ly places an insurmountable burden on the defense. Any burden relating to
use of a comparable worth standard instead of subjective criteria in valuing
jobs is also negligible when compared with the costs of employment
discrimination. Employers make assessments regarding the worth of dif-
ferent jobs every day. All Title VII requires is that employers explain such
assessments of job value, and the decisions that are based on them, on
grounds that are sex neutral.
The idea of innocent employers being required to pay a price for a crime
they did not commit is an emotional response to the law. Title VII applies to
all employers as a prescriptive act. It requires employers to guarantee that
discriminatory employment practices in this society will be corrected.
Although Title VII is applicable to all employers, only those employers using
market conditions to perpetuate discriminatory wage differentials between
women and men will feel the impact of its prescriptions. It should be made
clear that the use of market conditions to establish wages is not an innately
bad practice. Only when those market conditions fail to reflect the true value
of the job should their use be prohibited.
Judicial interference with the law of supply and demand is justified when
in I&'
See S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1964).
124 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 33,123, at 27,454.
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discrimination is present. The market is not an impersonal absolute; it is
simply a reflection of behavior and attitudes. Employer behavior and at-
titudes is exactly what Congress intended to alter in enacting Title VII.
Determination of wage-setting systems by the courts may very well lead
to complex cases being brought before unprepared adjudicators. However,
concern about the complexity of lawsuits does not lead to the conclusion that
the legislature is the proper forum rather than the judiciary. Congress' role
should be limited to making an initial policy determination regarding the
need to eliminate wage differentials between women and men. This they
have done with the enactment of Title VII. It is the courts' role to eliminate
discriminatory wage practices in individual cases.
The issues relating to job evaluation only require the courts' careful
scrutiny. In suits alleging market conditions as a defense to wage differen-
tials, courts should require precise definitions of the compensable factors
used by the employer and give greater weight to evaluations prepared by
multiple evaluators, as participation of several persons improves reliability.1"
The factors chosen, including comparison to the community wage rate, should
then be validated to overcome discriminatory effects. 2 ' Finally, courts must
make sure that the factors chosen by the employer are used reasonably in
light of their stated business purpose." The burden of producing and ex-
plaining job evaluations and validation studies rests on the parties, not the
court. Thus, manageability of the issues involved in Title VII wage discrim-
ination suits can be aptly handled by the judiciary.
In exceptionally difficult cases, the supervision and interpretation of
evidence presented might be given to special masters, appointed for the case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the appointment of a special
master in cases that are especially burdensome or require unique
experience." With the use of patience and experts, courts need not let prac-
tical concerns inhibit inquiry into a pervasive problem of discrimination
which is within the scope of Title VII.
IV. CONCLUSION
Realizing the full potential of Title VII protection against wage
discrimination should be the aim of the courts in the 1980's. The court of ap-
peals in Kouba has taken the first step in giving a solid interpretation of a
"factor other than sex" as it relates to wage discrimination litigation. It is
hoped that subsequent courts will further limit an employer's use of dis-
'2 WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 88, at 43.
120 d
12' Kouba, 30 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 33,123 at 27,454.
"I FED. R. CIv. P. 53(b).
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criminatory factors to determine wages, especially given the state of the
American economy. Women are now joining the labor force out of economic
necessity,"9 not simply to earn pin money."' To avoid poverty level subsist-
ence,'31 the wage gap between women and men must be examined and nar-
rowed. Rejecting market conditions as a "factor other than sex" could only
help reach this goal.
1" Women are maintaining an increasing proportion of all families; about 1 out of 6 (sixteen
percent) familids was maintained by a woman in March 1982, compared with more than 1 out of 8
(twelve percent) in 1972. FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 2, at 3.
" The pin-money hypothesis assumed that women workers were well-supported and sought
a paying job only as a means of securing extra cash to indulge frivolous feminine desires.
"' Women represented sixty-three percent of all persons below the poverty level who were
sixteen years of age and over in 1981. FACTS ON WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 2, at 3.
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